ect-ng/Main/ect.bbl
2023-03-12 23:33:51 +08:00

293 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{albert_rmp02}
R Albert, AL Barab{\'a}si, Statistical mechanics of complex networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Rev. Mod. Phys.}} \textbf{74}, 47--97
(2002).
\bibitem{shen_rsos18}
C Shen, C Chu, L Shi, M Perc, Z Wang, {Aspiration-based coevolution of link
weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game}.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Royal Society Open Science}} \textbf{5},
180199 (2018).
\bibitem{Pagan2019game}
N Pagan, F D\"{o}rfler, Game theoretical inference of human behavior in social
networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature Communications}} \textbf{10}, 5507
(2019).
\bibitem{melamed_pnas18}
D Melamed, A Harrell, B Simpson, {Cooperation, clustering, and assortative
mixing in dynamic networks}.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{115}, 951--956 (2018).
\bibitem{boyd2005solving}
R Boyd, PJ Richerson, Solving the puzzle of human cooperation.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Evolution and Culture}} \textbf{1},
105--132 (2005).
\bibitem{gachter2009reciprocity}
S G{\"a}chter, B Herrmann, Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous
insights and a new cross-cultural experiment.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B}} \textbf{364},
791--806 (2009).
\bibitem{rand_tcs13}
DG Rand, MA Nowak, Human cooperation.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Trends in Cognitive Sciences}} \textbf{17},
413--425 (2013).
\bibitem{perc_pr17}
M Perc, et~al., Statistical physics of human cooperation.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rep.}} \textbf{687}, 1--51 (2017).
\bibitem{nowak_11}
MA Nowak, R Highfield, {\em SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We
Need Each Other to Succeed}.
\newblock (Free Press, New York), (2011).
\bibitem{hrdy_11}
SB Hrdy, {\em Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual
Understanding}.
\newblock (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA), (2011).
\bibitem{bowles_11}
S Bowles, H Gintis, {\em A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its
Evolution}.
\newblock (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), (2011).
\bibitem{maynard_n73}
J Maynard~Smith, GR Price, The logic of animal conflict.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{246}, 15--18 (1973).
\bibitem{hofbauer_98}
J Hofbauer, K Sigmund, {\em Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics}.
\newblock (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.), (1998).
\bibitem{cressman_03}
R Cressman, {\em Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games}.
\newblock (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), (2003).
\bibitem{szabo_pr07}
G Szab{\'o}, G F{\'a}th, Evolutionary games on graphs.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rep.}} \textbf{446}, 97--216 (2007).
\bibitem{santos_prl05}
FC Santos, JM Pacheco, Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the
emergence of cooperation.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rev. Lett.}} \textbf{95}, 098104
(2005).
\bibitem{ohtsuki_n06}
H Ohtsuki, C Hauert, E Lieberman, MA Nowak, A simple rule for the evolution of
cooperation on graphs and social networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{441}, 502--505 (2006).
\bibitem{santos_pnas06}
FC Santos, JM Pacheco, T Lenaerts, Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in
structured heterogeneous populations.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{103}, 3490--3494 (2006).
\bibitem{santos_n08}
FC Santos, MD Santos, JM Pacheco, Social diversity promotes the emergence of
cooperation in public goods games.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{454}, 213--216 (2008).
\bibitem{tanimoto_pre07}
J Tanimoto, Dilemma solving by coevolution of networks and strategy in a $2
\times 2$ game.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rev. E}} \textbf{76}, 021126 (2007).
\bibitem{fu_pre09}
F Fu, T Wu, L Wang, Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in coevolutionary
prisoner's dilemma.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rev. E}} \textbf{79}, 036101 (2009).
\bibitem{lee_s_prl11}
S Lee, P Holme, ZX Wu, Emergent hierarchical structures in multiadaptive games.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rev. Lett.}} \textbf{106}, 028702
(2011).
\bibitem{rand_pnas14}
DG Rand, MA Nowak, JH Fowler, NA Christakis, Static network structure can
stabilize human cooperation.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{111}, 17093--17098 (2014).
\bibitem{fu2017leveraging}
F Fu, X Chen, Leveraging statistical physics to improve understanding of
cooperation in multiplex networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{New J. Phys.}} \textbf{19}, 071002 (2017).
\bibitem{allen2017evolutionary}
B Allen, et~al., Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{544}, 227--230 (2017).
\bibitem{fotouhi_rsif19}
B Fotouhi, N Momeni, B Allen, MA Nowak, Evolution of cooperation on large
networks with community structure.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{J. R. Soc. Interface}} \textbf{16},
20180677 (2019).
\bibitem{nowak_n92b}
MA Nowak, RM May, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{359}, 826--829 (1992).
\bibitem{perc_bs10}
M Perc, A Szolnoki, Coevolutionary games -- a mini review.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{BioSystems}} \textbf{99}, 109--125 (2010).
\bibitem{rand_pnas11}
DG Rand, S Arbesman, NA Christakis, Dynamic social networks promote cooperation
in experiments with humans.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{108}, 19193--19198 (2011).
\bibitem{fehl_el11}
K Fehl, DJ van~der Post, D Semmann, Co-evolution of behaviour and social
network structure promotes human cooperation.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Ecol. Lett.}} \textbf{14}, 546--551 (2011).
\bibitem{wang_j_pnas12}
J Wang, S Suri, D Watts, Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner
updating.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{109}, 14363--14368 (2012).
\bibitem{szolnoki_epl14b}
A Szolnoki, M Perc, Coevolutionary success-driven multigames.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{EPL}} \textbf{108}, 28004 (2014).
\bibitem{wang_z_njp14}
Z Wang, A Szolnoki, M Perc, Self-organization towards optimally interdependent
networks by means of coevolution.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{New J. Phys.}} \textbf{16}, 033041 (2014).
\bibitem{EHB34164}
P Barclay, Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for
humans.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Evolution and Human Behavior}} \textbf{34},
164--175 (2013).
\bibitem{zhang2018gaming}
Y Zhang, et~al., Gaming temporal networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
II: Express Briefs}} \textbf{66}, 672--676 (2018).
\bibitem{miritello2013time}
G Miritello, R Lara, E Moro, Time allocation in social networks: correlation
between social structure and human communication dynamics in {\em Temporal
Networks}.
\newblock (Springer), pp. 175--190 (2013).
\bibitem{GTN}
N Masuda, R Lambiotte, {\em A Guide to Temporal Networks}.
\newblock (World Scientific Publishing), (2016).
\bibitem{holme_sr12}
P Holme, J Saram{\"a}ki, Temporal networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rep.}} \textbf{519}, 97--125 (2012).
\bibitem{gracia-lazaro_pnas12}
C Gracia-L{\'a}zaro, et~al., Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation
when humans play a prisoner's dilemma.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{109}, 12922--12926 (2012).
\bibitem{BA}
AL Barab\'{a}si, R Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Science}} \textbf{286}, 509--512 (1999).
\bibitem{maynard_82}
SJ Maynard, {\em Evolution and the Theory of Games}.
\newblock (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.), (1982).
\bibitem{wang_js_sr17}
J Wang, Y Zhang, J Guan, S Zhou, {Divide-and-conquer tournament on social
networks}.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Scientific Reports}} \textbf{7}, 15484
(2017).
\bibitem{zhang_yc_sr15}
Y Zhang, G Chen, J Guan, Z Zhang, S Zhou, {Unfavorable individuals in social
gaming networks}.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Scientific Reports}} \textbf{5}, 17481
(2015).
\bibitem{barabasi_s99}
AL Barab{\'a}si, R Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Science}} \textbf{286}, 509--512 (1999).
\bibitem{Watts98Nature}
DJ Watts, SH Strogatz, Collective dynamics of ``small-world" networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{393}, 440--442 (1998).
\bibitem{evans2019cooperation}
AM Evans, DG Rand, Cooperation and decision time.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Current Opinion in Psychology}}
\textbf{26}, 67--71 (2019).
\bibitem{evans2015fast}
AM Evans, KD Dillon, DG Rand, Fast but not intuitive, slow but not reflective:
Decision conflict drives reaction times in social dilemmas.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General}} \textbf{144}, 951 (2015).
\bibitem{yamagishi2017response}
T Yamagishi, et~al., Response time in economic games reflects different types
of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{114}, 6394--6399 (2017).
\bibitem{spiliopoulos2018bcd}
L Spiliopoulos, A Ortmann, The {BCD} of response time analysis in experimental
economics.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Experimental Economics}} \textbf{21},
383--433 (2018).
\bibitem{fu_pre08b}
F Fu, C Hauert, MA Nowak, L Wang, Reputation-based partner choice promotes
cooperation in social networks.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Phys. Rev. E}} \textbf{78}, 026117 (2008).
\bibitem{gallo_pnas15}
E Gallo, C Yan, {The effects of reputational and social knowledge on
cooperation}.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{112}, 201415883 (2015).
\bibitem{wang2017onymity}
Z Wang, et~al., Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Science Advances}} \textbf{3}, e1601444
(2017).
\bibitem{sefton_ei07}
M Sefton, O Schupp, JM Walker, The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision
of public goods.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Econ. Inq.}} \textbf{45}, 671--690 (2007).
\bibitem{fehr_n02}
E Fehr, S G{\"a}chter, Altruistic punishment in humans.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{415}, 137--140 (2002).
\bibitem{PCB14e1006347}
X Chen, A Szolnok, Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a
feedback-evolving game.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{PLoS Comput. Biol.}} \textbf{14}, e1006347
(2018).
\bibitem{hauert_n04}
C Hauert, M Doebeli, Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of
cooperation in the snowdrift game.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Nature}} \textbf{428}, 643--646 (2004).
\bibitem{stewart_pnas12}
AJ Stewart, JB Plotkin, Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.
\newblock {\em\protect\JournalTitle{Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.}}
\textbf{109}, 10134--10135 (2012).
\end{thebibliography}