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\bibcite{albert_rmp02}{{1}{2002}{{Albert and Barab{\'a}si}}{{}}}
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\bibcite{maynard_82}{{27}{1982}{{Maynard}}{{}}}
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\bibcite{maynard_n73}{{28}{1973}{{Maynard~Smith and Price}}{{}}}
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\bibcite{melamed_pnas18}{{29}{2018}{{Melamed et~al}}{{Melamed, Harrell, and Simpson}}}
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\bibcite{perc_bs10}{{35}{2010}{{Perc and Szolnoki}}{{}}}
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\bibcite{shen_rsos18}{{44}{2018}{{Shen et~al}}{{Shen, Chu, Shi, Perc, and Wang}}}
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\bibcite{spiliopoulos2018bcd}{{45}{2018}{{Spiliopoulos and Ortmann}}{{}}}
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\bibcite{Watts98Nature}{{54}{1998}{{Watts and Strogatz}}{{}}}
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\bibcite{zhang_yc_sr15}{{56}{2015}{{Zhang et~al}}{{Zhang, Chen, Guan, Zhang, and Zhou}}}
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\bibcite{zhang2018gaming}{{57}{2018}{{Zhang et~al}}{{Zhang, Wen, Chen, Wang, Xiong, Guan, and Zhou}}}
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\begin{thebibliography}{57}
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\bibitem[{Albert and Barab{\'a}si(2002)}]{albert_rmp02}
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Albert R, Barab{\'a}si AL (2002) Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Rev
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Mod Phys 74:47--97
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\bibitem[{Allen et~al(2017)Allen, Lippner, Chen, Fotouhi, Nowak, and
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Yau}]{allen2017evolutionary}
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Allen B, Lippner G, Chen YT, et~al (2017) Evolutionary dynamics on any
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population structure. Nature 544:227--230
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\bibitem[{Barab\'{a}si and Albert(1999)}]{BA}
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Barab\'{a}si AL, Albert R (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks.
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Science 286:509--512
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\bibitem[{Barab{\'a}si and Albert(1999)}]{barabasi_s99}
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Barab{\'a}si AL, Albert R (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks.
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Science 286:509--512
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\bibitem[{Barclay(2013)}]{EHB34164}
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Barclay P (2013) Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially
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for humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 34:164--175
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\bibitem[{Bowles and Gintis(2011)}]{bowles_11}
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Bowles S, Gintis H (2011) A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its
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Y. Z. was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61503285) and the Municipal Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai (Grant No. 17ZR1446000). J. G. was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61772367) and the Program of Shanghai Science and Technology Committee (Grant No. 16511105200). S. Z. was supported by the Program of Science and Technology Innovation Action of the Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality (STCSM) (Grant No. 17511105204). G. C. was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (Grant No. CityU-11206320). K. C. was supported by ERC Consolidator Grant 863818 (FoRM-SMArt). M. P. was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (Grant Nos. J1-2457, J1-9112, and P1-0403).
|
Y. Z. was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61503285) and the Municipal Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai (Grant No. 17ZR1446000). J. G. was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61772367) and the Program of Shanghai Science and Technology Committee (Grant No. 16511105200). S. Z. was supported by the Program of Science and Technology Innovation Action of the Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality (STCSM) (Grant No. 17511105204). G. C. was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (Grant No. CityU-11206320). K. C. was supported by ERC Consolidator Grant 863818 (FoRM-SMArt). M. P. was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (Grant Nos. J1-2457, J1-9112, and P1-0403).
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@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
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\relax
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||||||
\providecommand\hyper@newdestlabel[2]{}
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||||||
\providecommand\HyperFirstAtBeginDocument{\AtBeginDocument}
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||||||
\HyperFirstAtBeginDocument{\ifx\hyper@anchor\@undefined
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||||||
\global\let\oldcontentsline\contentsline
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||||||
\gdef\contentsline#1#2#3#4{\oldcontentsline{#1}{#2}{#3}}
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||||||
\global\let\oldnewlabel\newlabel
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||||||
\gdef\newlabel#1#2{\newlabelxx{#1}#2}
|
|
||||||
\gdef\newlabelxx#1#2#3#4#5#6{\oldnewlabel{#1}{{#2}{#3}}}
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||||||
\AtEndDocument{\ifx\hyper@anchor\@undefined
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||||||
\let\contentsline\oldcontentsline
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||||||
\let\newlabel\oldnewlabel
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|
||||||
\fi}
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||||||
\fi}
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||||||
\global\let\hyper@last\relax
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|
||||||
\gdef\HyperFirstAtBeginDocument#1{#1}
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|
||||||
\providecommand\HyField@AuxAddToFields[1]{}
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|
||||||
\providecommand\HyField@AuxAddToCoFields[2]{}
|
|
||||||
\citation{RN254,RN255,RN256,RN257,RN258,RN259,RN260,RN261,RN262}
|
|
||||||
\citation{RN254}
|
|
||||||
\citation{RN255}
|
|
||||||
\citation{mturk}
|
|
||||||
\citation{psql}
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|
||||||
\citation{redis}
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|
||||||
\citation{sinatra}
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|
||||||
\citation{ruby}
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|
||||||
\citation{thin}
|
|
||||||
\citation{rfc6455}
|
|
||||||
\citation{fws}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {1}{\ignorespaces Platform architecture of the WoS.}}{3}{figure.1}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:arch}{{1}{3}{Platform architecture of the WoS}{figure.1}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {2}{\ignorespaces Landing page of the WoS.}}{4}{figure.2}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:landpage}{{2}{4}{Landing page of the WoS}{figure.2}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {3}{\ignorespaces Login page of the WoS.}}{4}{figure.3}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:login}{{3}{4}{Login page of the WoS}{figure.3}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {4}{\ignorespaces The main part of the experiment.}}{5}{figure.4}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:main}{{4}{5}{The main part of the experiment}{figure.4}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {5}{\ignorespaces The modal dialog box showing the request sent from a partner.}}{5}{figure.5}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:resp1}{{5}{5}{The modal dialog box showing the request sent from a partner}{figure.5}{}}
|
|
||||||
\citation{json}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {6}{\ignorespaces The modal dialog box of request composing.}}{7}{figure.6}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:request}{{6}{7}{The modal dialog box of request composing}{figure.6}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {7}{\ignorespaces The modal dialog box shows that the participant accepts the request.}}{7}{figure.7}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:resp2}{{7}{7}{The modal dialog box shows that the participant accepts the request}{figure.7}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {8}{\ignorespaces The new configuration page of the management interface.}}{8}{figure.8}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{fig:config}{{8}{8}{The new configuration page of the management interface}{figure.8}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lot}{\contentsline {table}{\numberline {1}{\ignorespaces The answer of acceptance of the privacy policy.}}{10}{table.1}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lot}{\contentsline {table}{\numberline {2}{\ignorespaces The distribution of the sex.}}{11}{table.2}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lot}{\contentsline {table}{\numberline {3}{\ignorespaces The ages of participants.}}{11}{table.3}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{tbl:age}{{3}{11}{The ages of participants}{table.3}{}}
|
|
||||||
\@writefile{lot}{\contentsline {table}{\numberline {4}{\ignorespaces The institutions of participants.}}{11}{table.4}\protected@file@percent }
|
|
||||||
\newlabel{tbl:inst}{{4}{11}{Questionnaire for Volunteers}{table.4}{}}
|
|
||||||
\bibstyle{sn-basic}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN254}{{1}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN255}{{2}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN256}{{3}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN257}{{4}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN258}{{5}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN259}{{6}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN260}{{7}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN261}{{8}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{RN262}{{9}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{mturk}{{10}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{psql}{{11}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{redis}{{12}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{sinatra}{{13}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{ruby}{{14}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{thin}{{15}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{rfc6455}{{16}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{fws}{{17}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\bibcite{json}{{18}{}{{}}{{}}}
|
|
||||||
\providecommand\NAT@force@numbers{}\NAT@force@numbers
|
|
||||||
1275
SI/2nd SI.log
1275
SI/2nd SI.log
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Load Diff
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SI/2nd SI.pdf
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SI/2nd SI.pdf
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@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ Round 14:
|
|||||||
\end{appendices}
|
\end{appendices}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Bibliography
|
% Bibliography
|
||||||
\bibliographystyle{sn-basic}
|
\bibliographystyle{unsrt}
|
||||||
% \bibliography{egt}
|
% \bibliography{egt}
|
||||||
\begin{thebibliography}{10}
|
\begin{thebibliography}{10}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user